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BOOK REVIEWS
INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF TUNA,
PORPOISE, AND BILLFISH:
BIOLOGICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL ASPECTS
By J. JOSEPH and J. GREENOUGH
Seattle: University of Washington Press. 1979. Pp. 253. $20.00.
Joseph and Greenough's book will evoke strong feelings in its
readers. Laymen unfamiliar with subtle and often unstated economic
concepts will be frustrated by its vagueness, conservationists appalled
by its bias for the fishery industry, and policymakers irritated by the
lack of proof that the policy solutions outlined in the book are either
effective or equitable. Nonetheless, it should be required reading
because it presents as no other book has the attitudes and ideals that
dominate the efforts of fisheries economists. As a consequence of the
book's length and elaborate detail, readers will find an expert appraisal of the complexity of fishery resource management. Concepts
like maximum sustainable yield, maximum net productivity, equity,
and efficiency are interwoven with the realities of international conflict.
The book presents a background of tuna management efforts and
a survey of conventional common property resource issues. The
authors describe six distinct tuna conservation options:
1) Control to 200 miles by individual coastal states;
2) Extension of the present Pacific overall quota system;
3) Open access management with participant fees and resource
adjacency allocations;
4) Regional coalitions;
5) Total allocation of the resources;
6) Resource allocation by competitive bidding.
The authors insist that theirs is an economic approach. In almost
every case, however, they ultimately judge a management option on
the basis of political accommodation. The political aspects overwhelm the economic theory and obscure biological relationships that
may be vital to both the survival of the porpoise and the viability of
the tuna fishery.
Much of the analysis actually is elaborate, though informed, speculation by the authors, as if thinking aloud-"suppose that allocations
are reduced ... suppose also that 200-mile fishing zones are phased
out ... low license fees do not appear likely . . . if fees were very
low, however... ," etc. The authors are concerned with income dis-
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tribution from tuna profits. But we are left in a vacuum when it
comes to deciding on proper management because we are not given
any information on the basis for tuna "ownership" except as a function of coastal boundary length, population, or historic harvest. Is
last year's American tuna harvest a measure of our equitable harvest
share? Are past injustices to be redressed? Can tuna equity be
decided without reference to other resource exploitation and social
injustice?
Most dramatically absent is a discussion of the vital role porpoise
play in reducing yellowfin tuna fishing cost. The deep-swimming
tuna choose to follow the surface swimming porpoise. Tuna fishers
spot the porpoise, herd them into a group with speedboats, encircle
them with deep nets, and draw the catch on board. If the porpoise
stock is threatened, the costs of tuna harvest would skyrocket
despite the actual tuna population or tuna reproductive rate. Fishers
have some incentive to release the porpoise from the nets to avoid
the time consuming task of untangling the dead animals from the
net, but conserving the porpoise to faciliate later harvest is a weak
incentive. Like other actions that cost the individual but benefit the
community, conservation is not pressed. Very little is known about
tuna-porpoise association. If genetically determined behavior (idiotypic) causes only a portion of a porpoise species to associate with
tuna, these special and useful porpoise all could be killed while the
abundance of similar looking porpoise concealed the extinction. The
authors describe the porpoise dilemma in a separate chapter, but fail
to incorporate these concerns in their policy discussions.
The authors hold that management is assured only by international agreement because tuna are highly migratory. The worst
consequences of bad management are a depleted tuna stock or a
threatened porpoise stock. Joseph and Greenough presuppose that a
combination of countries would support a fleet so effective that tuna
and porpoise would be harvested beyond the economically and
ecologically justifiable intensity, even if boats would fish only in
their own national waters, or more than 200 miles from shore.
It is equally possible that 200 mile limits and national management would reduce the overall tuna fishing effort and change the
type and scale of the fishing technology. For example, slower, more
energy efficient, boats operating within national waters could capture the harvest over the entire year, in contrast to the current regulation that encourages high speed, capital intensive fleets that harvest
the annual yellowfin quota within months of the season's opening.
Hasty harvest may cause fishers to be careless in porpoise protection.
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Because there is no proof that the current tuna harvest has allowed
tuna populations to reach optimal levels for maximum economic
yield, it is impossible to rule out the potential benefit of reducing
current harvest. Increased tuna populations would reduce harvest
effort, and might enhance porpoise protection by the easier harvest.
The book raises important questions. Read it as a critique of fisheries economics, and as an occasion to test your own ability to think
problems out.
STEPHEN 0. ANDERSEN
College of the Atlantic
Department of Economics

